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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

9 March 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: February

1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
 - a. PL0-Jordan

(1) The outcome of the Palestine National Council session will not enable King Hussein to take positive initiatives in response to President Reagan's Middle East proposals. Arafat succeeded in averting a damaging split in the PLO but at the price of restricting his maneuverability in further talks with Hussein. Although Arafat won approval for continuing the dialogue, he did not secure the Council's authority to appoint non-PL0 Palestinians to a joint negotiating team with Jordan.

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(3) There is a somewhat greater chance that Syria, Libya and their Palestinian clients will attempt to nullify Arafat's

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modest success by pressing the Saudis to withhold support for PLO strategy or by mounting terrorist actions, including assassination attempts against Arafat and his supporters.

b. Iran-Iraq

(1) Another large Iranian attack on the Doveyrich River front is likely in the next few weeks, but the prospects for a major breakthrough are remote.

(2) A second Iranian failure probably will oblige Tehran to revert to an indefinite war of attrition in the hope that a deterioration of Iraqi troop morale and the Iraqi economy will eventually force Saddam Hussein's overthrow.

c. Libya-Sudan-Egypt

(1) Qadhafi is undoubtedly smarting from the failure of the latest plot to oust Sudanese President Nimeiri. While he will probably remain cautious for a time, we can fully expect further actions against the nations of Subsaharan Africa and the U.S. and its allies.

d. Sino-Soviet Talks

(1) Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese expect a breakthrough in the second round of talks. The Chinese have introduced a complicating factor by stating they will raise the issue of the possible transfer of SS-20's to the Soviet Far East. Both sides, however, remain interested in keeping the door open to agreement on at least cultural and scientific exchanges. Alexander Bovin's mission to Beijing last month may have explored prospects for agreement on confidence-building measures along the border which could prepare the way for eventual mutual force reductions.

e. Southern Africa

(1) The infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas into northern Namibia last month and South Africa's military reaction have reduced the chances of even a limited disengagement of South African and Angolan/Cuban forces. South Africa probably will use the infiltration to

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justify increased military operations against SWAPO bases deep in Angola.

(2) The expansion of UNITA operations in central Angola also is likely to lead to a substantial increase in military activity on the Angola-Namibia front in the next few weeks.

f. Argentina

(1) President Bignone's announcement that elections will be held on 30 October and that the new government will take office in late January or early February 1984 has eased domestic tensions temporarily. Despite stern warnings by the government, the coming election campaign will generate renewed criticism of military rule, and another political crisis is likely before the elections.

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g. El Salvador

(1) The issue of Defense Minister Garcia's resignation probably will come to a head by the end of March. If he reneges on the earlier understanding that he would retire this spring, President Magana will either have to act on the military commission's likely recommendation that Garcia step down or risk a coup attempt by anti-Garcia officers.

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(2) The insurgents will attempt to exploit the power struggle in the officer corps by launching further large-scale attacks against towns, military outposts, and economic targets.

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David Y. McManis

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